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Medicine has enjoyed a chequered history. Peak discoveries, 
such as penicillin and insulin, have alternated with bogus 
treatments, such as bloodletting or mercury. General trust 
in medicine has also waxed and waned, although somewhat 
independently from medical efficiency. Bloodletting inspired 
more trust than handwashing later did. Nowadays, vaccines 
are far from being universally accepted and homeopathy has 
vocal defenders. More generally, defiance surrounds a num-
ber of treatments that are otherwise strongly supported by 
scientific data. Or are they? In ‘Medical Nihilism’, Jacob Ste-
genga precisely defends the eponymous thesis that our confi-
dence in medical interventions is too high and less warranted 
by science than we typically think. This is a timely endeav-
our, for medicine has perhaps never been more threatened 
than now by vested interests and industrial influences. This 
calls for a careful assessment of its results. At the same time, 
Stegenga is walking a fine line here. By explicitly addressing 
philosophers, medical professionals and the public simulta-
neously (p.7), he needs to remain clear enough to avoid his 
theses being misinterpreted and seized upon by anti-science 
movements. In this respect, he only partly succeeds, or so we 
will argue (among other things).
Stegenga defends the ‘radical position’ (p.3) that is medical 
nihilism by way of a ‘master argument’, which is fuelled by 
a variety of conceptual, methodological and empirical con-
siderations. Nonetheless, the book also spans a number of 
more classical topics in the philosophy of medicine. Its first 
part is conceptual. Drawing on the traditional debate about 
the concepts of health and disease, Stegenga endorses a hy-
brid account, where disease possesses both a causal and a 
normative basis. Stegenga insists that this conceptual frame-
work is indispensable for defining the effectiveness of medi-
cal interventions. In the hybrid account of disease, it follows 
that an intervention is effective if it targets the causal and/
or normative conditions, which, in his terms, should provide 
‘cure’, ‘care’ or both (p.36). In addition, effectiveness is to be 
primarily understood at a microphysiological level in relation 
to particular patients. It should be noted that among the con-
ceptions of disease discussed in chapter 1, the hybrid account 
is the most demanding one. In conjunction with Stegenga’s 
focus on interventions aimed at treating diseases, this con-
tributes to a narrowing of the scope of the analysis, allow-
ing him to avoid inflationary risks due to disease-mongering 
or overdiagnosis (which do not target diseases in the hybrid 
sense), which would taint our assessment of medical efficien-
cy. However, more traditional medical interventions (such as 
cosmetic surgery, abortion or contraceptives) are also exclud-
ed (p.52). In chapter 4, Stegenga turns to the gold standard of 
medical intervention that is the ‘magic bullet’ model. Magic 
bullets are interventions that are both highly effective and 
specific – that is, they successfully target a disease and noth-
ing else (hence the avoidance of side effects). Unfortunately, 
as Stegenga argues, very few contemporary pharmaceuticals 
come close to approximating this ideal (p.61) because of the 
lack of specificity of pharmaceuticals and of the complexity of 
organic systems – that is, for empirical as well as conceptual 
reasons. This is particularly important, as the dearth of magic 
bullets is one of the main reasons why we should adopt medi-
cal nihilism: we are unduly confident in medicine because we 
wrongly expect treatments to be magic bullets.
The second part (the best of the book in our view) deals 
with the methods that are used to test medical interven-
tions and assess their effectiveness. In chapter 5, Stegenga 
argues against the epistemic usefulness of hierarchies of ev-
idence. Medicine relies on various types of evidence, which 
are typically hierarchically ordered (first meta-analyses, then 
randomized controlled trials – RCTs – etc.). However, hier-
archies lead to utter neglect of some possibly relevant, low-
er-level evidence. Moreover, rankings may feature evidence 
tokens at best because quality varies too much within evi-
dence types. RCTs also suffer from drawbacks. For instance, 
they rarely warrant causal inference and their results are 
difficult to extrapolate to specific individuals. Meta-analyses 
hardly fare any better as they can turn out to be highly mal-
leable, giving leeway to what does or does not count as prima-
ry evidence, or how outcomes should be measured and aver-
aged. In short, ‘meta-analysis allows unconstrained choices 
to influence its result’ (p.67). In this context, it is of prime 
importance to be able to assess the quality of medical stud-
ies. This is what quality assessment tools aim to do (QATs). 
However, as chapter 7 shows, they do not succeed in securing 
objective assessments. Both inter-rater and inter-tool reli-
ability are weak, and we lack a theoretical basis to adjudicate 
between the available QATs. In short, evidence and evidential 
significance are underdetermined by theory. Stegenga then 
turns to issues concerning how the effectiveness of medical 
interventions is measured. Here, too, his diagnosis is bleak. 
Measuring instruments, such as depression questionnaires, 
lack specificity; formal measures usually report relative ef-
fects, while absolute effects are typically very small; effec-
tiveness assessments are difficult to extrapolate, due to the 
numerous differences between test subjects and ordinary 
patients; finally, regulations regarding drug approval are too 
weak and usually allow one to disregard unfavourable evi-
dence. Overall, these factors conspire to have us overestimate 
the effectiveness of medical interventions. At the same time, 
chapter 9 argues, harmful effects are systemically underes-
timated by medical research. A major problem is that phase 
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one trials (first-in-human studies) are often not published 
(Stegenga speaks of 95%) and are sometimes kept secret. The 
issue is that when a researcher is unaware of past evidence of 
harm, this leads to a misleading impression of prior probabil-
ity in terms of how harmful the molecule under investigation 
is, making the probability lower than it should be. This effect 
is compounded by a selection bias (test subjects are typical-
ly healthier and more uniform than ordinary ones) and the 
fact that harms are typically provided by disregarded types 
of evidence (e.g., case studies). As a result, the probability of 
harmful effects is underestimated ‘for all drugs’. Note that 
the arguments in this chapter could apply to pharmaceutical 
procedures not aimed at the treatment of diseases (such as 
contraceptives or pain-killers).
The third and last part of the book provides the finishing 
stroke and makes the case for medical nihilism, before offer-
ing a possible way forward. Stegenga first reviews the many 
biases that can affect evidence in medical research, many 
of which are mentioned in previous chapters. Confirmation 
bias is ubiquitous and insufficiently controlled for (as illus-
trated by blind-breaking issues). Even the best designs fail 
to mitigate instrument or recruitment biases and post-hoc 
analysis (for instance, the much-debated practice of ‘p-hack-
ing’) is widespread. Finally, publication itself is often biased. 
Although it is difficult to estimate their frequency, cases of 
deliberate fraud do exist. In any case, deliberate deception 
relying on the many existing biases is common. Such practic-
es may be driven by unresolved conflicts of interest, and their 
upshot is to raise the probability of evidence of effectiveness, 
whereas less biased methods would lower it. In chapter 11, 
Stegenga finally gathers most of the book’s insight into one 
general, formal argument – his ‘master argument’ – in favour 
of medical nihilism, which mixes empirical, conceptual and 
methodological considerations. The argument is worth pre-
senting in some detail, both because of its importance and the 
coherence it brings to the book. Let H be the claim that a giv-
en intervention is effective and E the evidence we have re-
garding this intervention. We want to know the probability 
that H is true given the evidence, that is, to assess P(H|E). 
Bayes’ rule teaches us that obtaining such evidence depends 
on the prior probability P(E) – the prior probability P(H) that 
the intervention is efficient, and the probability P(E|H) that 
we would have such evidence were the intervention efficient, 
as per the following formula: P(H|E)=P(E|H).P(H)/P(E). But 
P(E) is high because of biases, fraud, harm underestimation 
and the malleability of methods. P(H) is low because of the 
ubiquity of past rejected medical interventions and because 
magic bullets are expected to be rare for conceptual reasons. 
Finally, P(E|H) is low because of discordant evidence and 
small effects, which are widespread in medicine but should 
not be strongly expected for truly effective interventions. As 
a result, P(H|E) is low: we should have low trust in the ef-
fectiveness of any intervention given the available evidence. 
This is medical nihilism. Potential objections are dismissed: 
our perception that medicine is ‘awesome’ is misguided; reg-
ulation and peer-review are insufficient safeguards; the argu-
ment is not anti-science but asks for better science. 
How? In his final chapter, Stegenga claims that we should 
preregister trials before collecting data, pre-specify outcomes 
and make trial details public. But ‘tweaking methodological 
details’ will not be enough. The regulation of medical inter-
ventions should be strengthened and procedures leading to 
the commercialization of new drugs may be revised. One may 
also think of more global changes, targeting the patent system 
or private funding of most pharmaceutical research. An even 
better strategy, Stegenga argues, would be to change our re-
search priorities and move away from the magic bullet model. 
Stegenga gives a few suggestions: focusing on socio-economic 
disparities and their impact on health; defining research pri-
orities, depending on their probability of success (following 
Ioannidis’ work, already largely cited in the bias and fraud 
chapter); and finally redirecting research towards what he 
calls ‘gentle medicine’. This excludes aggressive treatments 
and includes lifestyle interventions, such as better nutrition, 
sport and the like (p.191). 
It is remarkable that Stegenga manages to pack so much into 
an otherwise reasonably short book. It blends a wealth of ex-
amples and epistemological considerations into a coherent, 
impressive, formally backed-up argument. Nonetheless, it 
invites discussion on a number of points. Firstly, the choice 
of title. This enables Stegenga to make his work part of a long 
history, browsed in the introduction, of scepticism with re-
gard to medicine. However, an important feature of Stegen-
ga’s main thesis does not fit well with the radicalness of ‘ni-
hilism’: for his medical nihilism is a relative thesis. Although 
one can find more radical formulations in the book (in the in-
troduction in particular), it argues that our confidence in the 
effectiveness of medical interventions should be lower (may-
be much lower) than it currently is. Stegenga does not mean 
to show that this confidence should be low in absolute terms. 
The title also suggests – and the book claims, for that matter 
– that we should adopt nihilism in all medical interventions. 
However, the arguments given in the book essentially con-
cern pharmaceutical drugs. Not only are other interventions, 
such as surgical interventions, rarely mentioned, but much of 
the argumentation does not apply to such cases, specifically 
because RCTs are not in order. Conversely, most of what Ste-
genga claims would hold for drugs that do not aim to treat 
diseases, for instance, contraceptive drugs or painkillers. In 
short, ‘Medical Nihilism’ here refers to a form of relative ni-
hilism regarding some type of pharmaceutical interventions.
Stegenga’s main ambition is a unificatory one. He intends to 
show how various reasons for scepticism about the efficien-
cy of medical drugs (some of which are not original) can be 
rigorously articulated to form one coherent argument. This 
effort towards clear argumentation is, in places, obscured by 
the many cross-references contained in the book. It is, in 
fact, sometimes hard to exactly locate the arguments. There 
may also be a concern, in the context of Stegenga’s unificato-
ry project, with the definitions of disease that are discussed 
in chapter 2. It is not immediately clear why an argument 
concerning the effectiveness of drugs should rely on a defi-
nition of disease. However, that Stegenga opts for hybridism 
is illuminating here. Choosing the most restrictive concept of 
disease is a way to be maximally liberal as to what counts as 
a treatment for a disease: if a disease has both a causal and 
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normative basis, then it is sufficient to target one of these to 
qualify as a treating intervention. As a consequence, Stegen-
ga’s medical nihilism seems to leave room for his optimistic 
stance on gentle medicine: the arguments he develops es-
sentially deal with interventions targeting the causal basis of 
disease, but it may be that interventions targeting their nor-
mative basis fare better. In combination with the focus on in-
terventions aimed at treating diseases, hybridism also makes 
irrelevant for medical nihilism all the evidence and doubts 
we may have concerning treatments of conditions that are 
not pathological. Stegenga thereby gives up on an artificially 
easy way to make his point. Apart from chapter 2 as a whole, 
there are smaller passages whose relevance to the overall ar-
gument is disputable. In section 11.3 for instance, Stegenga’s 
insistence on the fact that the drugs he discusses are (or have 
been) extensively used, however suggestive it may be, does 
not support his point that ‘for many medical interventions, 
the best evidence available today suggests that they are barely 
effective, if at all’ (p.171). 
Stegenga also has ambitions for the proposed argument it-
self. It is meant to be general, holding for any medical inter-
vention whatsoever, and not to be a merely inductive argu-
ment drawing on the enumeration of evidence that specific 
drugs are not as effective as one might have thought. The lat-
ter is necessitated by the fact that some bits of the argument, 
specifically the one dealing with magic bullets, are concep-
tual. Although some of its empirical premises are inductive-
ly established, the master argument, to which we now turn, 
is a Bayesian argument. Under its formal guise, it is not as 
clear-cut as it seems. To recall, our evidence-based trust in an 
intervention, P(H|E), should be low partly because P(E|H)/
P(E) is low, which in turn stems from the fact that P(E) is 
high and P(E|H) is low. However, these two claims appear 
to envisage distinct evidential scenarios. P(E) is claimed to 
be high because we should expect biases, fraud and mallea-
ble methods to provide positive evidence for the effectiveness 
of any intervention whatsoever. So, for any intervention, the 
evidence will be favourable and likely to show significant ef-
fects. P(E|H), however, is estimated as being low in reference 
to cases where E is evidence of small effects or discordant 
evidence. These cases are frequent, the argument goes, but 
unlikely if the intervention is effective. So, the two claims 
are hard to square. If the evidence E is strongly favourable, 
then P(E) is high, but P(E|H) should be high too, as it is the 
probability that evidence indicates the effectiveness of a truly 
effective intervention. If the evidence is discordant, then, fol-
lowing Stegenga, P(E|H) will be low – but P(E) should be too! 
We should not expect much discordant evidence in a world 
plagued by vested interests, biases and malleable methods. 
More generally, the point is that P(E) and P(E|H) will rise 
and fall together as the evidence becomes more or less fa-
vourable. 
This does not mean that medical nihilism is false, for even 
if the two probabilities are dependent, P(E|H) may still be 
lower than P(E) in general. The foregoing argument, if cor-
rect, only establishes that the general value of P(E|H)/P(E) 
is indeterminate. We would need to quantitatively estimate 
P(E|H) and P(E) to issue a verdict. This is a daring and pos-
sibly difficult task to achieve for all cases. Still, the value of 
P(E|H)/P(E) may turn out to be low in many or even most 
contexts. Moreover, as long as it is not too high, medical ni-
hilism may follow from the claim that P(H) is low. This is the 
point that if our confidence in the effectiveness is very low 
to begin with, it would remain low even after a reasonable 
amount of evidence has been gathered. So, a general case for 
medical nihilism can be as strong as the motivations for a low 
P(H), namely, the inductive argument that past effective in-
terventions have been uncommon and the conceptual argu-
ment that magic bullets should be hard to come by.
Still, are there not ways to assess some probabilities that 
do not rely on painstaking review and study of past inter-
ventions? Stegenga gestures towards one in his chapter on 
bias and fraud, where he argues that P(E) increases with the 
number of biases that plague medical research. Here, too, his 
argument is probabilistic, and here, too, it is debatable. Sup-
posing E is some evidence that an intervention is effective, 
then P(E) can be calculated according to the principle of total 
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) with a value that is lower than the initial P(E). There 
is thus no guarantee that P(E) will increase; again, only a con-
text-sensitive analysis could tell. (As an aside, the principle 
of total probability applies when the various possibilities are 
independent, although there is no reason for biases to be so; 
and the fact that even unknown biases should typically favour 
the overestimation of effectiveness, as also assumed in ap-
pendix 5, is debatable.) Overall, there is doubt that a formal 
take was the best way to spell out the book’s argument.
Finally, Stegenga seems to understand his defence of ‘gen-
tle medicine’ as an important consequence of ‘medical nihil-
ism’. Firstly, what is ‘gentle medicine’? Stegenga co-opts the 
French words la médecine douce. Rhetorically, this is not an 
obvious move. Stegenga does not argue for complementary or 
alternative medicine – he himself admits that much alterna-
tive medicine is not ‘gentle’ because it entails physical manip-
ulation. So, what does the expression mean? Stegenga writes 
that ‘gentle medicine is concerned with attending to what it 
is like to be a person confronting disease’ (p.191). However, 
his later description of ‘gentle medicine’ does not target the 
experience of illness. Rather, Stegenga lists medical inter-
ventions that he considers as ‘gentle’. They are, in his words, 
‘targeting the normative’ (p.51) and they are thus particularly 
wide-ranging. They go from pharmaceutical painkillers and 
palliative care to ‘simply caring’ and lifestyle interventions 
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(e.g., promoting physical activities or decreasing stress lev-
els), all the way to societal changes. Are such interventions 
‘gentle’ though? Why presuppose that interventions are ag-
gressive when targeting the causal basis of disease, yet gen-
tle when targeting the normative one? Painkillers have led to 
addictions; lifestyle changes can be distressing and societal 
changes unruly. Conversely, public health measures and so-
cio-economic factors may target the ‘causal basis’ and not 
solely the ‘normative basis’ of disease (for instance, whether 
a population has access to enough food is not a normative 
factor). In other words, the distinction between ‘gentle’ and 
‘aggressive’ does not seem to track the distinction between 
the ‘causal basis’ and the ‘normative basis’ of disease.
This lack of a clear-cut distinction between gentle and ag-
gressive interventions is not problematic in itself, since, in 
his closing section, Stegenga chiefly aims to indicate possibly 
fruitful avenues for future medical research, for which a het-
erogenous list is certainly well-suited. However, this has an 
unfortunate consequence, as gentle medicine is now threat-
ened by nihilism as well. Note firstly that there is nothing to 
prevent us from applying most of Stegenga’s arguments to 
the normative basis of disease (as medical nihilism is part-
ly supported by the underestimation of harms and some 
treatments targeting the normative basis are pharmaceutical 
drugs). Secondly, the effectiveness of lifestyle interventions 
is notoriously difficult to measure, as is measuring welfare in 
general. But why not expect the effects of diet or physical ac-
tivity to be as small as those of ‘aggressive’ treatments? Why 
expect biases to be less pervasive? This suggests that we have 
no reason not to consider gentle medicine (however ethically 
preferable it may be) to be epistemologically on a par with its 
aggressive counterpart. This does not mean it is not worth 
exploring further; but other alternatives might also be worth 
pursuing, such as multiple therapies based on the accumu-
lation of small effects, for instance, which might have been 
mentioned as well.
This discussion does not detract from the book’s value. If any-
thing, it is testimony to the many debates it is likely to gener-
ate, firstly, because it spans a wide array of topics in the phi-
losophy of medicine and, secondly, because of the clarity of 
the careful scrutiny of various scientific methods, which the 
book provides. Indeed, regardless of the cogency and scope 
of Stegenga’s main unifying argument, it is difficult not to be 
affected by his relentless streak of negative conclusions – the 
lists of failed interventions, of forgotten or buried studies, of 
loose methods, of undetected harms and manipulated data. 
In other words, it is difficult not to feel that there really is 
something to medical nihilism. In this, Stegenga succeeds. 
That there are things to discuss in the book does not dimin-
ish the urgency with which medical research should evolve 
– whether this entails it becoming gentler or something else 
entirely.
